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THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS
OF I.R.C. SECTION 501(c)(3) AND
WHY THEY MUST GO
JAMES

S.

GANTHER*

Financial contributions are the lifeblood of tax-exempt
organizations. Without such support, charitable organizations
would be forced either to curtail their services to the public or
cease to exist.' The laws governing the tax treatment of
exempt organizations are contained in section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code). 2 The provisions under
this section of the Code allow various types of tax exemptions
for groups organized and operated exclusively for many purposes, including religious, charitable, and educational activities.' While the issues raised in this comment are important to
groups organized for many different purposes, this comment
will concentrate on the effects section 501(c)(3) has on religious bodies.
Section 501 exemptions are of two general types: those
entities that qualify under section 501(c)(3) of the Code are
exempt from any income tax; further, those individuals who
contribute to such organizations may deduct the amount of any
contribution from their taxable income, as provided in section
170(a) of the Code.' Donations to section 501(c)(3) organizations are also deductible for purposes of gift taxes and estate
taxes.5 Religious bodies generally fall under section 501 (c) (3).
Groups that qualify as section 501(c)(4) organizations are likewise exempt from income tax. Those who choose to contribute
to section 501(c)(4) organizations may not, however, deduct
their contributions from their taxable income.6 Thus, the
exemption under section 501(c)(3) is the more valuable,
* Associate, Piper & Marbury, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1984, University
of Notre Dame;J.D. 1988, University of Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar,
1986-88.
1. Caron & Dessingue, LR.C. § 501(c)(3): Practical and Constitutional
Implications of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J. L. & POL. 169, 178 (1985).
2. I.R.C. § 501 (1986). Regulations clarifying this section can be found
in Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(a)-I to 1.501(k)-i.
3. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
4. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (1986).
5. I.R.C. §§ 2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2) (1986).
6. See I.R.C. § 170(c).
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to better attract donations
because it enables an organization
7
that are necessary for its success.
Tax exemptions come with restrictions designed to prevent their abuse. 8 These limitations, however, implicate important constitutional considerations and have given rise to
substantial litigation. The situation is made even more complex when the organization involved in a tax dispute is a
church. 9 Such a situation dredges up the problems of interpreting the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
amendment, as well as the free speech clause.' 0
This comment will use the example of Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker'" to illustrate the deficiencies of the relevant Code provisions. Next, the comment will dissect the
infirmities inherent in section 501 (c)(3). It will then discuss the
proper role of the religious voice in public policy debates and
the relationship between churches and the state in that area.
Finally, the comment will propose a workable and coherent
replacement of I.R.C. section 501(c)(3).
7. Amended Complaint at para. 37, Abortion Rights Mobilization v.
Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (No. 80 Civ. 5590). While
donations are attracted more easily if they are deductible from the donor's
taxable income, the importance of deductibility is difficult to measure. The
studies of Dr. Douglas M. Lawton, Publisher of The Philanthropic Trends Digest,
indicate that tax considerations "generally come toward the bottom of the
list" of reasons for charitable giving. Lawton, Tax Reform: A Blessing or Curse
for Philanthropy?, PACE, Mar. 1987, at 75.
8. The Code provides exemption from income tax to "[c]orporations
. . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or
educational purposes.., no substantialpart of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . and which does not
participate in, or intervene in [including the publishing or distributing of
statements], any political campaign on behalf of any candidatefor public office."
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986) (emphasis added).
9. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
110 F.R.D. 337, 4 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
11.
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker is on hold pending resolution of a
contempt citation against a non-party. That case, United States Catholic
Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
1987), rev'd 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988), is currently on remand to the Second
Circuit.
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I.

THE EXAMPLE OF ABORTION RIGHTS MOBILIZATION,
INc. v. BAKER

In a case originally styled Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v.
Regan (ARM I),2 the plaintiff and twenty-eight other institutional, clergy, and private party plaintiffs sued then-Secretary
of the Treasury Donald T. Regan. The plaintiffs demanded
revocation of the section 501(c)(3) tax exempt status enjoyed
by the Roman Catholic Church in the United States (the
Church).' The plaintiffs claimed that the Church violated the
prohibition on political activity that accompanies section
501 (c)(3) legislation and that the Secretary of the Treasury derogated his duty by failing to enforce that prohibition against
the Church. 4

Section 501(c)(3) affords its benefits only to those organizations that qualify as to nature and purpose and that refrain
from both lobbying and political activity.1 5 The difference
between the two restrictions that section 501(c)(3) imposes is
important to highlight. The first restriction is to limit the influencing of legislation, that is, lobbying. This is not an absolute
prohibition; only if a "substantial" part of the organization's
activities are related to lobbying will that group run afoul of the
Code. 6 The second restriction is on "political activity." The
definition of "political activity" is not always clear; the line
between compliance and violation is obscure.' 7 The prohibition on political activity is absolute, and the penalties for violating it are severe."
Abortion Rights Mobilization's (ARM) complaint centered
on the Church's activities in relation to Catholic teaching on
abortion. t9 The plaintiffs alleged that actions such as the following constituted "political activity" within the meaning of
section 501(c)(3): (1) attacks against pro-abortion candidates
12.

Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471

(S.D.N.Y. 1982).

13. In the initial action, the Church, identified as the United States
Catholic Conference (USCC) and the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops (NCCB), was dismissed as plaintiff. Id. at 485.
14. Id. at 475.
15. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). See text quoted supra note 8.
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1976).
17. Note, Religion and Political Campaigns: A Proposal to Revise Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 536, 543-44 (1981).
18. The penalty for violating the prohibition on political activity is loss of
the organization's § 501(c)(3) status. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(2) (1986).
See supra text accompanying note 4. For an example of a proposed remedy,
see A.R.M.'s amended complaint.
19. Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at paras. 19-29.
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in parish bulletins, (2) letters from Church officials promulgated via pulpit and paper supporting pro-life candidates by
name, and (3) sermons that supported or opposed particular
candidates for public office based on each candidate's position
on the abortion issue. The plaintiffs further contended that
many priests regularly urged their parishioners to donate to
right-to-life committees, to obtain pro-life literature, and to
sign the nominating papers of right-to-life candidates.
Morever, the plaintiffs alleged that many of the dioceses of the
Roman Catholic Church in the United States have contributed
substantial sums of money to political groups that oppose
abortion. 20
Abortion Rights Mobilization has already generated four
reported decisions in the Southern District of New York, 2 ' one
from the Second Circuit, 22 and most recently one from the
United States Supreme Court.2 ' These decisions have focused
primarily on procedural matters. In its last decision, the district court for the Southern District of New York levied a fine of
100,000 dollars per day against the Church for refusing to
comply with a discovery order. The court stayed the fine pending appeal of the case to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Church and ARM argued before that bench in June of
1986. A divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's contempt decision 2-1 in August of 1987.24 The
Church petitioned the Supreme Court for review, which it
granted on December 7, 1987. The high Court heard arguments concerning the contempt order on April 9, 1988. The
Supreme Court handed down its decision on June 9, 1988-a
partial victory for the Church-and remanded the case to the
Second Circuit.2 5 Until the contempt issue is decided, the fine
will not accumulate against the Church. Should the plaintiffs
prevail on the merits, the Church faces a drastic penalty: ARM
demands
20. Id. at para. 28.
21. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); 552 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); 603 F. Supp. 970
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); A.R.M. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337, 4 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(Callaghan) 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
22. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc., 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987).
23. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988) (reversing 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987)).
24. See supra note 22.
25. See supra note 23.
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judgment . . . ordering the Secretary [of the Treasury]

and the Commissioner [of the Internal Revenue Service]
to take all actions necessary or appropriate to enforce the
Code . . . including without limitation, revoking the tax

exemption of the Roman Catholic Church under section
501(c)(3) of the Code, assessing and collecting all taxes
due thereby, and notifying or causing the Church to
notify contributors to the Church that they are not entitled to deduct such contributions on their individual tax
26
returns.

For its part, the Church claims that the political activity
restrictions violate the Constitution and, thus, should not be
used to revoke its tax exemption. In an amicus brief filed on
behalf of the United States Catholic Conference and eight
other American religious bodies, the Church asserted that the
free speech clause "protects churches no less than other concerned citizens or groups when they engage in political speech
on matters of public concern." 27 Furthermore, the amici contend that the Code offends both the free exercise clause and
the establishment clause of the first amendment. The free
exercise clause "affords additional protection against conditioning the tax status of a religious body upon surrender of the
church's right to announce sincerely held religious beliefs that
relate to public policy questions." 28 The establishment clause
is implicated because it "prohibits the government from implementing a tax policy which prefers religious bodies which are
silent on public issues over religious bodies which speak out on
-matters of public concern. '"29
If Abortion Rights Mobilization is eventually resolved in the
plaintiffs' favor, the results would be far-reaching and devastating for most organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3).
Not only could the existence of every group that enters the
political fray be threatened,3" but the crucial voice of moral
26.

Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at Count Five. The relief that

ARM seeks, however, may run afoul of the code provisions dealing with
church audits. See I.R.C. § 7611 (Supp. IV 1986).
27. Amicus Curiae Brief of National Council of Churches of Christ in the
U.S.A. at 25, Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 824 F.2d 156 (2d

Cir. 1987) (No. 86-6092) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief].
28.

Id. at 17. Some scholars disagree with this position and claim that the

free exercise clause grants no additional protection beyond what the free
speech clause already grants. See, e.g., West, The Free Exercise Clause and the
Internal Revenue Code's Restrictions on the Political Activity of Tax-Exempt

Organizations, 21
29.
30.

WAKE FOREST

L.

REV.

395, 425 (1986).

Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 27, at 25.
Caron & Dessingue, supra note 1, at 178.
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vision would be stifled from political debate. Both ARM's
amended complaint and the amicus brief filed in opposition to
it highlight the porous nature of the political activity restrictions of section 501(c)(3) and the severity of their
implications.3"
II.

THE TROUBLE WITH

501(c)(3)

Section 501(c)(3) of the Code is riddled with deficiencies.
Aside from the friction with the first amendment alluded to
above and developed in subparts H (A), (B), and (C) below, the
restrictions on political activity are also suspect because of
equal protection concerns, vagueness, lack of a remedy commensurate with the significance of the offense,3 2 and their conflict with the historic trend in tax law. 33 Furthermore, the effect
of an active enforcement of section 501(c) (3) as written would
be to exclude much of the moral discussion necessary for
responsible public policy from the debate surrounding the formation of such policy.
A.

The Free Speech Clause

To understand a discussion of the free speech implications
of the current tax Code, the activities that the Code seeks to
prohibit must first be understood. The Code reflects the policy
that the Treasury Department should be neutral in political
affairs. 34 Both tax exemptions and tax deductions have the
same effect in the eyes of the law as a government subsidy, 5
and the government does not wish to subsidize attempts to
influence legislation or elections.6
The late Stanley S. Surrey of the Harvard Law School was
a champion of this view of tax exemptions as actual government subsidies.3 7 He claimed that the net effect of not collecting taxes ("tax expenditures"), which the government could
legally exact, is identical to directly subsidizing the exempt
organizations from funds collected. While this is true in a
bookkeeping sense-the money ends up in the same place via
31. See supra notes 26 and 27.
32. For a discussion of these issues as they apply to the ARM case, see
Caron & Dessingue, supra note 1, at 181-97.
33. Note, supra note 17, at 540-41.
34. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133 (CI. Ct. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
35. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
36. See supra note 34.
37. Surrey, supra note 35.
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exemption or subsidy-a significant difference exists between
the two as far as the taxpaying public is concerned. Perception
is frequently more important than reality. As Professor Peter
Wiedenbeck of the University of Missouri School of Law stated:
The central thesis .

.

. is that, because of public percep-

tions, some social goals cannot be achieved through an
explicit spending program as well or better than they can
be through a tax expenditure ....

Instead of seeing spe-

cial tax allowances (exclusions, deductions, credits, deferral or rate reductions) as implicit expenditures of public
funds, most taxpayers view such allowances as reducedgovernment confiscation.... It simply would not be politically

feasible to substitute direct expenditure programs for the
existing tax expenditures.3 8
In other words, subsidies and tax expenditures are not so
neatly interchangeable as Professor Surrey assumed."9
The range of activities falling under the Code's definition
of intervention in "any political campaign on behalf of any candidate" is broad.4 ° For example, voter education programs,
including the dissemination of voting records, will constitute
forbidden conduct unless the issues covered are of general
interest to the voting public.4" To illustrate, if an exempt
organization concerned with the preservation of wildlife distributed to its members a report showing how certain congressmen voted on environmental issues, that action would amount
to the type of activity the Code seeks to prevent. For such a
voter education effort to pass Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
muster, the issues covered must be broad and those who
42
receive the results must not be limited to a narrow group.
Neither may the questions exhibit any bias for or against cer38.

Wiedenbeck, Paternalism and Income Tax Reform, 33 U. KAN. L.

REV.

675, 678-79 (1985) (emphasis in original).
39. Id.
40. See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154. Noted constitutional scholar
Laurence Tribe supports the opposite conclusion: "[T]he free exercise
principle should be dominant when it conflicts with the anti-establishment

principle. Such dominance is the natural result of tolerating religion as
broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest
appearance of establishment." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1201 (2d ed. 1988).
41. See Horn & Conrad, Memorandum to the North Carolina Policy
Council (September 30, 1986).
42. Id. See also Carron & Dessingue, supra note 1, at 176.
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tain issues or candidates. 43 Lack of partisan motivation behind
the styling of questions or selection of issues is immaterial.4 4
Oral statements supporting or opposing particular candidates are also beyond the pale of permissible behavior. "While
presumably a sermon or series of sermons which touched upon
political subjects would not amount to 'propaganda' as used in
the statute, nothing in the statute prevents such an interpretation by the court."'4 5 An exempt organization is not entitled to
publish or distribute statements, 4 6 give financial support to a
campaign, or provide volunteers or facilities.
In Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States,47
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said that the
prohibitions enumerated above did not violate the first amendment's free speech clause. The court in that case said that the
appellee church had a simple choice: "engage in all such activities without restraint, subject, however, to withholding of the
exemption or, in the alternative, the taxpayer may refrain from
such activities and obtain the privilege of exemption." 4 8 While
on paper that may not appear to restrict an organization's right
to free speech, the judgment has that effect. If an exempt
organization elects to state its position on a matter of public
concern, it will lose more than its tax exemption. Because tax
deductible contributions are the lifeblood of exempt organizations, a loss of that exemption could result in the demise of the
organization. Thus, an exempt organization's survival could

depend on its remaining mute even when that organization's
purpose compels it to speak out. In short, the restrictions in
section 501(c)(3) go too far to satisfy the requirements of the
free speech clause of the first amendment.
The Supreme Court
49
decision.
the
review
to
declined
When the Tenth Circuit decided ChristianEchoes, it failed to
address a Supreme Court precedent that was on point. In
Speiser v. Randall,5" the Court invalidated a provision of the California Constitution that conditioned receipt of a tax exemption on the nonadvocacy of overthrow of the government by
43.
44.
45.
L. REV.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Comment, Religion in Politics and the Income Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM
397, 420 n.172 (1973).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(i-iii) (1986).
470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 857.
414 U.S. 864 (1973).
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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unlawful means. 5 The Court established the principle that the
government may not withhold a public benefit because a person chooses to exercise a constitutional right. The California
provision was not saved by its labelling the benefits "privileges" rather than "rights."
In situations such as that presented in Abortion Rights Mobilization, a strict interpretation of section 501(c)(3) would prohibit the Catholic Church from publicizing its views on a matter
of great public concern and moral import, although individual
Catholics could speak out on their own behalf. But this distinction runs counter to Supreme Court pronouncements on the
value of political expression. The Court has acknowledged that
[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution.
The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to
such political expression in order to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of polit52
ical and social changes desired by the people.
Such discussion is rendered less effective when people are
restricted from speaking out as part of a larger group. In the
same year that the Tenth Circuit decided Christian Echoes, the
United States Supreme Court handed down Kusper v. Pontikes.5"
In that case, a state law forbade an Illinois voter from voting in
a party primary if she had voted in another party's primary
within the previous two years. 54 In striking down that statute,
the Court declared that "freedom to associate with others for
the common advancement of political beliefs and rights" is a
right guaranteed by the first amendment.5 5 As written, section
501(c)(3) of the Code violates that first amendment right of
assembly. The Code has the effect of stifling the type of group
speech of which ARM complains, when religious views have
practical political expression.
In 1976 the Supreme Court struck down the limits on individual and group campaign expenditures contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act. 5 6 The Court said that "(a]dvocacy
of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no
less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 529.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
414 U.S. 51 (1973).

54.

Id.

55. Id.
56. Buckley, 421 U.S. at 1.
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discussion of political policy in general or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." 5 7 Yet this is the very type of protected activity that the Code has the effect of inhibiting.
Since its decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,5 8 the
Supreme Court has stressed a "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." 59 In Mills v. Alabama,6" the Court
invalidated an Alabama law forbidding newspapers from
endorsing candidates on election day. The decision of the
Court stated that "there is practically universal agreement that
a major purpose of [the first] Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes
discussion of ...

candidates."'"

The Supreme Court applied this principle to religious
bodies in McDaniel v. Paty.6 2 In that case, a Tennessee statute
prevented an ordained minister from holding any elected state
post specifically because he was a minister. Justice Brennan
wrote in concurrence:
[RIeligious ideas, no less than any other, may be the subject of debate which is "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen ....
That public debate of religious ideas, like any other,
may arouse emotion, may incite, may foment religious
divisiveness and strife does not rob it of its constitutional
protection. The mere fact that a purpose of the Establishment Clause is to reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife, does not place religious discussion,
association, or political participation in a status less preferred than rights of discussion,
association, and political
63
participation generally.
In First NationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti,6 4 the plaintiff challenged a Massachusetts law forbidding corporations from
spending money to influence voters before a referendum, if the
referendum did not materially affect the corporation. Justice
Powell wrote for the Court:
57.

Id. at 48.

58.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

59.
60.
61.

Id. at 270.
384 U.S. 214 (1966).
Id. at 218.

62.

435 U.S. 618 (1978).

63.

Id. at 640.

64.

435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about
which persons may speak and the speakers who may
address a public issue. . . . If a legislature may direct
business corporations to "stick to business," it may also
limit other corporations-religious, charitable, or civicto their respective "business" when addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the expression
of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment.
Especially where, as here, the legislature's suppression of
speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views
to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended.6 5
In spite of what appears to be clear guidance on the issue from
the highest court in the land, the current Code does nothing to
foster the type of widespread discussion that the Court seeks to
encourage in our society. Neither does the Code make room
for the fact that charitable organizations enjoy
the same right as
66
individuals to engage in the political fray.
For the government to legitimately infringe on so fundamental a right as that of free speech (or, for that matter, freedom of religion or equal protection), it bears the burden of first
showing a compelling state interest to be served by the
infringement and then demonstrating that the means employed
to achieve that end are the least restrictive possible. No such
interest has been demonstrated. The claim that allowing tax
deductible dollars to influence legislation goes against sound
public policy is undermined by the fact that such expenses are
indeed deductible under other sections of the Code. In addition, the manner of effecting the restriction of first amendment
freedoms is not the least restrictive means possible. The
importance the Supreme Court has placed on allowing only the
least restrictive means of attaining a demonstrated compelling
state interest can be seen in its decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 6 7 the first great case in modern religion clause jurisprudence. In Cantwell, the Court struck down an ordinance that
forbade religious solicitation without a license. 68 The Court
held that the license requirement would unduly burden the free
exercise of religion, because the state could come up with a less
65.

Id. at 785 (citation omitted).

66.
67.
68.

Id.
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Id. at 306.
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restrictive means of achieving the desired end of preventing
fraud.
Even assuming that a compelling state interest exists for
reigning in political activity by religious groups, the penalty
contained in the Code could hardly be considered the least
restrictive means of attaining that end. Indeed, a restriction
more total than an absolute prohibition of any political activity
by a section 501(c)(3) organization, especially where "political
broadly defined as in the current Code, is difficult
activity" is as
69
to imagine.
B.

The Free Exercise Clause

Although the free speech considerations surrounding section 501 (c)(3) of the Code are substantial, they are by no means
the only constitutional infirmities affecting that section. The
free exercise clause ensures that religious bodies may exercise
their beliefs without fear of governmental interference. 70 The
Supreme Court has already held that the government may not
employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views. 7 ' "Preaching religious beliefs, therefore,
is not only protected by the free speech guarantee of the first
amendment . . . but has the additional protection of the free

exercise clause. Thus, the right to engage in religiously motivated
rests on a strong constitutional
political proselytizing
72
foundation."
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the political activity prohibition of section 501(c)(3) violates the free
exercise clause. 73 As in the case of state actions that inhibit
free speech, a government regulation that places a burden on
the free exercise of religion can withstand constitutional scrutiny only if that regulation serves a compelling state interest.
Having already discussed the absence of any such compelling
political activity be considinterest, the question becomes, can
7
ered a valid exercise of religion? 1
The answer to that question, without doubt, is an unqualified "yes." The National Conference of Catholic Bishops
69.
70.

Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 27, at 15.
L. TRIBE, supra note 40, at 1203. For an excellent treatment of the

free exercise clause, see id. at § 14-8.
71. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
72. Note, supra note 17, at 554.
73. Caron & Dessingue, supra note 1, at 189.
74. For an analysis of just what can amount to religious practice, see
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
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(NCCB) declared in its recent statement on political
responsibility:
[I]t is the Church's role as a community of faith to call
attention to the moral and religious dimension of secular
issues, to keep alive the values of the Gospel as a norm
for social and political life, and to point out the demands
of the Christian faith for a just transformation of
society.7 5
The Catholic Church is not the only religious body that sees a
political dimension to its religious imperatives. In testimony
before the House Ways and Means Committee, a witness on
behalf of the United Methodist Church put forth the following
opinion quoting the Methodist General Conference:
"We believe that churches have the right and duty to
speak and act corporately on those matters of public policy which involve basic moral or ethical issues and questions. Any concept of church-government relations
which denies churches this role in the body politic strikes
at the very heart of the religious liberty. The attempt to
influence the formation and execution of public policy at
all levels of government is often the most effective means
available to churches to keep before modern man the ideal of a
made to serve the ends of
society in which power and order are
76
justice andfreedom for all people."
Professor Leo Pfeffer, perhaps the pre-eminent scholar on
the separation of church and state in America, takes a different
view of the matter. In his opinion, absolute separation of church
and state is the greatest guarantee of free exercise. 77 To his
mind, American churches should not poke their noses into the
affairs of Caesar, and the formation of public policy is one such
affair.7 8 Professor Pfeffer sees the principle of separation and
freedom as a unitary principle. 79 "Notwithstanding occasional
instances of apparent conflict, separation guarantees freedom,
and freedom requires separation ...

religious freedom is most

75. UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY:
CHOICES FOR THE 1980s, A STATEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD,
UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE 4 (rev. ed. Mar. 22, 1984).
76. Legislative Activity by Certain Types of Exempt Organizations: Hearings on
H.R. 13720 Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 303
(1972) (statement of Dr. J. Elliott Corbett, Board of Christian
Concerns, United Methodist Church).

77.

L.

PFEFFER, CHURCH,

STATE

AND

FREEDOM

727 (1967).

opposing viewpoint, see Part III of this comment, infra.
78. L. PFEFFER, supra note 77, at 727.

79. Id.

Social
For an

206

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF IA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

secure where church and state are separated and least secure
where church and state are united." 8 The question of separation thus becomes where to mark the border between the
realms of Church and State. The NCCB would allow participation in political activity, while such actions would lie beyond the
pale of Pfeffer's view. The Supreme Court has yet to squarely
address the question and draw the line.
The Supreme Court has to date declined to define the
meaning of protected religious belief or practice. In Thomas
v.Review Board," a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses
appealed from an Indiana Supreme Court decision denying
him unemployment benefits. Mr. Thomas claimed that he quit
the job manufacturing tanks, because the production of armaments violated his religious beliefs. The initial review board
findings accepted his testimony. The Indiana Supreme Court
reversed, saying Mr. Thomas merely made a "personal philosophical choice rather than a religious choice." 8 2 The Indiana
high court decided that Mr. Thomas' choice was not a religious
one in part because the plaintiff was "struggling" with his
beliefs and he was not able to "articulate" his belief precisely.8"
In reversing the Indiana decision, the Court said that
"Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he
drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake
to dissect religious beliefs .. "84 The Court went on to hold
that a person may not be compelled to choose between a first
amendment right and participation in an otherwise available
public benefit.8 5 The Indiana law did not compel a violation of
conscience. That is the effect, however, when the state conditions receipt of a public benefit on the performance of an
action proscribed by a religious belief or on forbearance of an
action required by a religious belief. When pressure is applied
on believers to modify their behavior and violate their beliefs,
"a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be
indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial."8 6
Thus, even indirect burdens on the free exercise of religion
are invalid under the Constitution. The restrictions contained
in section 501(c)(3) amount to such a burden. An impermissi80.

Id.

81. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
82. Id. at 714.
83. Id. at 715.
84.

Id.

85. Id. at 717-18.
86. Id.
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ble burden on religion is clearly imposed when religious
groups are forced to choose between their tax-exempt status,
and the opportunity to engage in political activities demanded
by their beliefs. The restriction on political activity contained
in section 501(c)(3) is certainly more than just an indirect burden on religion such as the one struck down in Thomas, and it
should therefore be ejected from the Code as a violation of the
free exercise clause.
C.

The Establishment Clause

The first amendment to the Constitution declares that
Congress "shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." 8 7 Interpreting just what that phrase means in a given
situation has produced judicial headaches for nearly forty
years. Chief Justice William Rehnquist has referred to "our
oft-repeated statement that the Establishment Clause presents
especially difficult questions of interpretation and application.
It is easy enough to quote the few words comprising that
[clause]. It is not at all easy, however, to apply this Court's various decisions construing the Clause .... "88
The establishment clause does more than forbid the actual
establishment of a state church. The clause prohibits even any
law respecting an establishment of religion. A law may be one
"respecting" the establishment of religion while still falling far
short of actually attaining that forbidden end.8 1 "A given law
might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one
'respecting' that end in the sense of being a step that could lead
to such establishment and hence offend the first
amendment." 9°
According to the Supreme Court, the establishment clause
was included in the first amendment to protect against three
main evils: state sponsorship of religion, state financial support
to religious groups, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity.9" To guard against these perceived evils, the
Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test to measure state
action to see whether that action amounts to a "law respecting
the establishment of religion." First, the statute in question
must have a secular legislative purpose. Second, the principle
or primary effect of the legislation must not be the encourage87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
Id. (emphasis in the original).
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
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ment or enhancement of religion. Finally, the statute must not
foster an excessive entanglement of government in religion.9 2
Given this as the current mind of the Court, section 501(c)(3)
will be scrutinized under this three-pronged analysis. For state
action to be valid under the establishment clause, all three tests
must be satisfied.
Analyzing the legislative intent behind the insertion of the
political activity restrictions into section 501(c)(3) is nearly
impossible. The Supreme Court accords great deference to the
legislature's stated intent when it enacts bills, provided no
extrinsic evidence shows that the legislature meant something
else.9" This practice is of little help in the case of the political
activity restrictions found in section 501(c)(3), however. As
those restrictions were inserted as a floor amendment without
comment, they have hardly any legislative history.9 4 In such a
situation, one may reasonably impute upon the legislature the
intention to bring about the effects that would naturally follow
from its enactment.
The principle of primary effect of active enforcement of
section 501(c)(3) as written is far easier to ascertain. As discussed above, enforcement of the political restrictions would
force an unacceptable choice upon religious bodies: refrain
from religiously inspired involvement in the body politic or forfeit the tax-exempt status which contributes to the organization's success. 95 This clearly has the effect of inhibiting
religion-one of the prime evils against which the first amendment was drafted to protect.
Although the free exercise clause provides substantial protection of conduct grounded in religious belief, not all burdens
on religion are automatically unconstitutional. The state may
impose some restrictions on religious liberty, provided that
such restrictions are essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest. 96 In past cases, religiously-motivated activities such as polygamy9 7 and racial discrimination 9 8 have been
92. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. For a critique of the wisdom and utility of the
Lemon test, see Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The
Enganglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 205 (1980).
93. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
94. Caron & Dessingue, supra note 1, at 186.
95. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
857 (10th Cir. 1972).
96. L. TRIBE, supra note 40, at 1251. See generally id. at § 14-13.
97. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
98. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983).
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classified as involving an overriding governmental interest. It
would do violence to reason, however, to place religiously
motivated political speech in the same category as those
practices.
Just as the establishment clause demands that the government not promote or inhibit religion in general, neither may
the government favor one religion over another. The basic
purpose of the establishment clause is that "no religion be
sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited." 9 9 The effect of the Code is to violate this command of
the Constitution. The restrictions on political speech contained therein favor religious bodies that are silent on public
issues over those that speak out on matters of public concern.' 0 0 As William Thompson, a former official of the Presbyterian Church, said in testimony before the House Ways and
Means Committee, "[W]hen government grants tax exemption
to church bodies which are silent on public issues, while denying or threatening to deny, such exemption to those which are
not silent, it is discriminating for the former and against the
latter in violation of the prohibition against an establishment of
0
religion." l'
That argument can cut both ways. In Abortion Rights Mobilization, the clergy plaintiffs claimed that the government's failure
to enforce the restrictions of section 501 (c)(3) against the Catholic Church violated the establishment clause. This is so, those
plaintiffs insisted, because while they enjoy the same tax benefit
as the Church, they do not engage in political activity for fear
of losing their exemption.1 0 2 The Supreme Court, however,
explained in Bob Jones "that state action does not necessarily
violate the establishment clause merely because it' 0 happens
to
3
coincide with the tenets of some or all religions."'
The final element of the Supreme Court's three-prong
analysis is the prevention of "excessive entanglement" between
government and religion. This condition is based on the belief
that the barrier between religion and the state is better a wall
high and strong than a semi-permeable membrane. The political activity restrictions in section 501 (c)(3) fail this test as well.
99. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
100. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 27, at 25.
101. Influencing Legislation by Public Charities: Hearings on H. R. 13500 Before
the House Ways and Means Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1976) (statement of
William Thompson, former official of the Presbyterian Church).
102. Amended Complaint, supra note 7 at 13, para. 42.
103. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604.
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The exemptions in question are not of themselves an
entanglement of government in religion. As former Chief Justice Burger said, in a case concerning the tax exemptions
enjoyed by religious bodies:
There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and
the establishment of a religion .... The exemption cre-

ates only a minimal and remote involvement between
church and state and far less than the taxation of
churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between
church and state, and tends to compliment and reinforce
0 4
the desired separation insulating each from the other.1
Although granting tax exemptions does not constitute an
excessive entanglement of government with religion, monitoring compliance with the restrictions on those exemptions
would be. The case of United States v. Dykema 105 provides an
example of what that entanglement looks like. In Dykema, a
church pastor challenged the discovery the IRS demanded in
an action to determine the tax-exempt status of his church, as
well as his individual tax liability. On appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, the court held that in connection with an investigation
of whether a church has operated exclusively for religious purposes or has engaged in forbidden activity, the IRS could
observe the organization's activities and receive testimony from
those connected with the activities. Furthermore, the IRS
could freely examine church bulletins, programs, and other
publications, as well
as minutes, memoranda, and financial
06
books and records.
This decision of the Seventh Circuit is hard to square with
other Supreme Court holdings. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,' 0 7 for
example, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes that provided aid to non-public schools because the
programs would require "restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role
and the state supervision of nonpublic school accounting procedures required to establish the cost of secular as distinguished from religious education."' 0' If such entanglement as
Lemon forbids is too much for the Constitution to bear, then the
far greater entanglement required for the strict enforcement of
section 501(c)(3) as it currently exists should also be invalid.
104. Walz, 397 U.S. at 676.
105. 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981).
106. Id. at 1100.
107. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
108. Id. at 603.
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The restrictions on religiously-motivated political activity
contained in section 501(c)(3) thus fail at least two of the three
relevant tests that determine a violation of the establishment
clause. Section 501(c)(3) without those restrictions would be
free of this constitutional infirmity. Far from amounting to an
establishment of religion as the plaintiffs in Abortion Rights
Mobilization insist, the less restrictive tax policy would widen the
safety zone between the spheres of religion and government.
As former Chief Justice Warren Burger opined in Walz v. Tax
Commission:
Nothing in this national attitude toward religious tolerance and two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from
taxation has given the remotest sign of leading to an
established church or religion and on the contrary it has
operated affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise
of all forms of religious beliefs. Thus, it is hardly useful
to suggest that tax exemption is but the "foot in the
door" or the "nose of the camel in the tent" leading to an
established church.10 9
Professor Pfeffer sees tax exemptions for religious bodies
as more than just the camel's muzzle in the tent. He agrees
with the Walz Court that the establishment clause means "no
religion be sponsored or favored.""
But, because he also
subscribes to the Surrey theory that tax exemptions are actually
subsidies in disguise, such exemptions amount to the very
sponsorship of religion he claims the establishment clause was
written to prevent.'
III.

THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE

A.

The Importance of Moral Considerations

The government may not enact any law that stifles the
vitality of religious activity without a compelling state interest.
Far from there being a compelling reason to limit the role of
religion in the public debate, every reason exists to encourage
the expression of religiously-motivated opinion. The best
interests of the republic are served by fostering the participation of all divergent points of view in the body politic. But even
109.
110.
111.

Walz, 397 U.S. at 678.
Id.at 669.
L. PFEFFER, supra note 77.
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in a debate where discussion is "uninhibited, robust, and 2wideopen," the voice of religion deserves special attention."
Worth noting too is the distinction between where
churches can participate in the .body politic and where they
should. Although churches have the constitutional right to
express their religious views in public policy debates and the
political process generally, the virtue of prudence dictates that
they do so carefully."' The impact of religious voices can be
diluted through overuse; credibility dwindles at the hands of
those who cry wolf too often or in the wrong context." 4 When
a religious body or leader condemns the Panama Canal Treaty
or recognition of Mainland China as a violation of God's will,
the public may question the importance of such speech. But to
allow an example of one speaker's lack of prudence as "proof"
is an ad hominem argument.
To consider the proper place of morality in the formation
of public policy, one must first lay to rest two popular myths:
first, that morality is strictly a private affair and, second, that
policy formation should be a matter of strictly secular concern." 5 To slay the first dragon, the language of morality is
laced with the term ought." 6 Ought implies action, and humans
necessarily act in society. What one believes is a moral imperative will be reflected in one's actions; one's actions, in turn, will
affect the surrounding society. As with morality, so too does
religious belief have its outward direction. Christian Scriptures
tell us that faith without action behind it is dead." 7 "Religion
is relevant to the life and action of society. Therefore religious
freedom includes the right to point out this social relevance of
religious belief."" ' 8 To live with morals confined within the
boundaries of one's skin is nearly impossible and hardly
realistic.
To say that policy formation is strictly a secular matter is
also unrealistic. Moral considerations permeate nearly every
significant policy question facing our society, and these factors
112.

Symposium: The Religious Leader and Public Policy, 2 J.L. & REL. 367

(1985).
113.

254.
114.
115.
116.

McBrien, Religion and Politics in America, AM. MAG., Nov. 1, 1986, at

Symposium, supra note 112, at 376.
Id. at 367.
Boyle, A Catholic Perspective on Morality and the Law, 1 J.L. & REL. 227

(1985).
117. James 2:17.
118. Vatican Council II, Declarationon Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS
OF VATICAN II 683 n.l 1 (1963).
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must be taken into consideration when deciding those questions. For example, fiscal policy may seem far removed from
the realm of morality, or at least from any arena where religious voices may competently and prudently speak. But consider: what if that policy requires the termination of programs
for the homeless, the hungry, the mentally ill? What if that policy improves our domestic economy at the expense of developing countries? To formulate policy without the input of a
moral vision is to build upon a foundation with several important bricks missing. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin put it this way:
[T]he distinctive mark of human genius is to order every
aspect of contemporary life in light of moral vision. A
moral vision seeks to direct the resources of politics, economics, science, and technology to the welfare of the
human person and the human community.'' 9
So morality is a valid factor in the formation of public policy. But how important is this factor? Moral norms are of critical importance; such norms are the most fundamental
requirements of what John Finnis calls "practical reasonableness," the most basic normative demands. 20 As such, they
cannot be trumped by any other practical considerations. If
this is true-if moral norms are the ultimate principles for practical reasonableness-then law must have its foundation in
moral principles.' 2 ' Thus, all law worthy of our allegiance is a
moral undertaking, and all debate surrounding the formation
of that law should be shot through with implicit or explicit consideration of moral values.
One could question the legitimate place of morality in the
public debate when the demands of morality are often unclear.
What is morally proscribed for one person may well be morally
required of another. Some moral views may be common to
nearly all of society, for instance, that the taking of an innocent
life is wrong. Society splits, however, on the moral issue of
whether abortion amounts to the taking of an innocent life.
The fact remains, however, that decisions in such areas where
values are not shared is a decision between competing moral
visions, not between morality and amorality.
If morality has so key a role on the stage of public debate,
the separation of church and state must not be seen as a means
to exclude the voice of religion from that stage, because that
voice most frequently focuses public attention on moral consid119.
120.

121.

Symposium, supra note 112, at 370 (remarks of Cardinal Bernardin).
(1980).
Boyle, supra note 116.

J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
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erations. Rather, proper separation should provide room for
the insights of each religious tradition to be set forth and
tested. 122
The voice of morality is a necessary ingredient for the creation and continued vitality of a democratic society. A difference exists between a separation of the institutions of church
religiouslyand the institutions of state and the separation of
23
based morality from discussion of public policy.'
The government must leave ample room for the expression of religious values as they apply to matters of public concern. Those who proclaim the paramount importance of moral
concerns-whether religious bodies, religious leaders, or private citizens-must help foster the informed public opinion
necessary for self-government. Moral voices should be more
than just tolerated in the milieu; they should be given as free a
rein as possible to perform a function vital to the formation of a
more just society. To quote Reverend Richard J. Neuhaus, a
noted church-state scholar:
The ... public square is at best a transitional phenomenon. It is a vacuum begging to be filled. When the democratically affirmed institutions that generate and
transmit values are excluded, the vacuum will be filled by
the agent left in control of the public square, the state. In
this manner, a perverse notion of the disestablishment of
religion leads to the establishment of the state as
religion. 124
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin echoes this concern. In an address
before the American Bar Association, he said: "[t]he exclusion
of the moral factor from the policy debate is purchased at a
high price not only for our values but also in terms of our interTo ignore the moral dimension of public policy is to
ests ....
forsake our constitutional heritage."' 2 5
B.

How the Government Has Accommodated Religion
Through the Tax System

Churches (as well as other kinds of organizations covered
by section 501(c)(3)) are exempt from taxation because of the
benefit society receives from their operation. This benefit is
based on the theory that "the government is compensated for
122.
123.

Symposium, supra note 112, at 372 (remarks of Cardinal Bernardin).
R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY

IN AMERICA 84 (1984).

124.
125.

Id. at 86.
Symposium, supra note 112, at 371 (remarks of Cardinal Bernardin).
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the loss of revenue by the relief from financial burden which
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public
funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the
general welfare."' 2 6
Professor Pfeffer rejects this rationale for church tax
exemptions. He asserts that exemptions cannot be justified by
the claim that the government would have to shoulder addi27
tional burdens if exempt organizations ceased their services. 1
Pfeffer submits that while this may be true concerning certain
social programs, such a rationale would not support exempused exclusively for worship, or the income
tions for property
28
of clergy. '

Professor Pfeffer's interpretation of the establishment
clause is wrong. First, as explained in subpart II(A) above, the
conception of tax exemptions on which he depends is incomplete. Not all benefits to society as a whole can be reduced to
monetary terms, such as the benefit society derives from the
promotion of virtue. More fundamentally, however, he fails to
properly balance the two religion clauses contained in the first
amendment. Either clause, taken to its logical extreme, tends
to erode the other. 1 29 Professor Pfeffer places too much
emphasis on the establishment clause, to the detriment of the
free exercise of religion.
The federal government has recognized the tangible and
intangible benefits to the general welfare that religion promotes since the very genesis of the nation. Tax exemptions for
churches were not among the evils which the framers and
ratifiers of the establishment clause sought to avoid.13 0 Within
a decade of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, at least four
states enacted statutes granting tax exemptions for churches.
In 1802, the District of Columbia-governed by the federal
government-passed a bill exempting places of worship from
property taxes.' 3 ' Such exemptions from property tax became
the norm, and today they exist in all fifty states and the District
of Columbia.13 2 Commenting on the rationale behind the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, Justice Hugo Black said, "[t]he
people there, as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual liberty could be achieved best under a government that was
126.
127.

H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939).
L. PFEFFER, supra note 77.

128. Id.
129. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
130. Id. at 664.
131. Id. at 677.
132. Id. at 676.
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to tax, to support, or otherwise assist any
stripped of all power
' 33
or all religions."'
Churches have been immune from income taxation as well
since that tax first appeared on the national scene in 1894. In
1917, individuals were first allowed to deduct the amount of
any contribution to an exempt organization from their taxable
income, provided the contribution was used exclusively for the
purposes for which the organization was granted the exempCode of 1926 added a similar deduction
tion. 3 4 The Revenue
35
for estate taxes.'
The first hint of the coming restrictions came in 1919,
when the Treasury Regulations contained a prohibition on
"controversial" or "partisan" political activity.136 Congress
intensified that prohibition in the 1934 Code, where one of the
prohibitions currently in the Code first appeared. That version
of the Code introduced the prohibition against a "substantial"
amount of activity directed toward the influence of7 legislation
(that is, lobbying), or "carrying on propaganda."'3
The original restrictions on political activity were created
to ensure neutrality of the Treasury in political matters and to
clip the wings of what one Senator described as "organizations
that are receiving contributions in order to influence legislation
and carry on propaganda."' 38 In other words, some exempt
organizations were becoming little more than fronts to promote the political designs of the contributor. For this reason,
the restrictions applied only to those organizations that
devoted a "substantial" amount of their efforts toward influencing legislation. Courts continued to employ a broad definition of the term substantial to avoid having to apply the severe
penalty to organizations where lobbying was closely related to
their exempt purpose. The statute allowed for some "play in
the joints" for exempt organizations to participate in the body
politic without fear of losing the tax status often necessary for
their survival.
The restriction on substantial lobbying entered the Code
on the heels of the Second Circuit's decision in Slee v. Commissioner.' 39 In that case, the court held that the American Birth
Control League's attempt to repeal anti-birth control legisla133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
Note, supra note 17, at 545.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546.
Id.
42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
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tion in the United States removed it from the Code's definition
of a charitable organization, as that activity was beyond the
40
scope of the purpose for which the exemption was granted.
The court of appeals noted, however, that in many cases such
lobbying could be within the purpose of an organization's
exemption. For example, a group devoted to the prevention
of child abuse could support laws to achieve that end; educational institutions could lobby for state aid; literary groups
could push for a relaxation of standards of censorship. In
those cases, the court said, "the agitation is ancillary to the end
in chief, which remains the exclusive purpose of the
association." 141
The absolute prohibition on campaign intervention came
in 1954 as a floor amendment to the Code. Senator Lyndon B.
Johnson of Texas sponsored the amendment and introduced it
with little comment. Thus, no legislative history exists to clarify the precise evil it was intended to prevent. 4 2 One commentator, however, suggests that Senator Johnson introduced the
amendment to frustrate the efforts of a group in Texas that he
"believed had provided indirect financial support to a campaign opponent."' 14 ' A similar prohibition on political activity
had been voted down in the senate in 1934, at the same time
that the original
restrictions on "substantial" lobbying were
44
approved.1

Whatever the reasoning behind Senator Johnson's amendment, current tax policy no longer supports it. In 1954, the
Treasury Department did not allow tax exemptions for any
political activity. Eight years after the enactment of the restriction on campaign activity, Congress revised section 162(e) of
the Code to allow businesses to deduct expenses incurred in
140. Id.
141. Id. at 185.
142. At the time Congress was considering the legislation that became
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and while that legislation was
before the United States Senate, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson offered
an amendment to prohibit political campaign activity by charities.
Although the record [88 Cong. Rec. 9128 (1954)] does not reflect his
motive, he was unhappy because a charitable foundation in Texas
was (ostensibly) channeling some funds into the campaign of an
opponent and he wished to end that practice. This amendment also
survived and remains embodied in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) today with the
original language.
Lobbying and Political Campaign Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm., 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987) (statement of Bruce R. Hopkins).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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direct lobbying efforts.' 45 Although the Code does not allow
deductions for any campaign activity by businesses and labor
unions, businesses are permitted'to operate political action
committees (PACs). PACs are groups established to influence
legislation and support political candidates favorable to the
views of the organization that established them. The income of
these PACs is tax deductible, so the Code provisions have the
effect of allowing business or labor organizations to deduct
expenses incurred in directly attempting to influence legislation or elect particular candidates.' 46 The option of an affiliated PAC, however, is not available to organizations exempt
under I.R.C. section 501 (c)(3). 147 And while the use of a PAC
for speaking out on political matters is impossible for section
501 (c)(3) religious groups, the use of a section 501 (c)(4) affiliate is impracticable. To return to the Abortion Rights Mobilization
example, the activities of which the plaintiffs complain are generally confined to the teaching and preaching associated with
worship services. The notion of a priest deferring to a section
501 (c)(4) representative (or identifying himself as such) whenever a sermon touched upon a moral issue with political implications should illustrate the impracticality of setting up an
affiliated section 501 (c)(4) to be responsible for all actions that
could fall under the Code's broad definition of political activity.
Such would be, in any case, a triumph of form over substance.
The trend of Congress over the past four decades has been
to use the tax Code to encourage as many voices as possible to
actively participate in the formation of public policy.' 4 8 Given
these facts, it seems that section 501(c)(3) is a step backward,
because it places the voice of religiously-motivated morality at
a disadvantage when competing for attention in the public
square. Congress should rewrite section 501(c)(3) to eliminate
its shortcomings.
145.

Note, supra note 17, at 548.

146. Id.
147. The fact that § 527 imposes a tax on the political expenditures of
§ 501(c) organizations and permits such organizations to establish separate
segregated funds to make political expenditures does not sanction these
activities by § 501(c)(3) organizations. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-f(f)
(1976); see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7904064 (Oct. 15, 1978), where the IRS held that a
501(c)(19) organization could establish a PAC because the Code and
Regulations were silent as to the extent of political activity permissible for
such organizations.
148.

Note, supra note 17 at 548-551.
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IV.

A PROPOSED REVISION

Congress has attempted to bring some clarity to the situation via section 501(h) of the Code. Under this provision, an
exempt organization may elect to spend up to certain defined
amounts on lobbying without fear of losing its exempt status.14 9 In effect, section 501(h) defines "substantial" lobbying.

But the section leaves no more room than does section
501(c)(3) for "political activity" and goes no further towards
defining political activity.' 5 0 Less than one percent of all charitable groups eligible to elect under section 501(h) have exercised that option; 151 religious groups are specifically prohibited
from doing so. Section 501 (h) may be a "safe harbor" but the
harbor is too small and the safety it provides too little.
To create a coherent replacement for the current law the
IRS should incorporate the following suggestions into the
Code:
1. Limit the definition of "lobbying" to express advocacy
of specific legislation. This would settle the greatest area of
uncertainty concerning lobbying. Any limitation on grass roots
lobbying communications short of such express advocacy
should be eliminated. A communication should be deemed
educational so long as it does not urge its reader to take some
legislative action with respect to specific legislation. In other
words, only express advocacy of specific legislation should be
limited to an "insubstantial" amount of the organization's
activities.
2. Define exactly what substantial means in this context.
"Substantiality" should be measured in a simple and straightforward manner, by the percentage of expenditures actually
devoted to express lobbying. "Insubstantial" expenditures
could be taxed according to section 501(h).
3. Limit the definition of intervention in a political campaign to communications or other activities expressly supporting or opposing a particular candidate or party. This would
allow charitable and educational organizations to discuss public
policy issues without fear of losing tax-exempt status, so long
149. Section 501(h), set forth below, was adopted in 1976. Regulations
have yet to be published clarifying this section. I.R.C. § 501(h) (1986).
150. As Representative J.J. Pickle of the 10th District of Texas put it,
"[c]lear-cut definitional rules relating to lobbying and political activity are
lacking in the law, and difficult to develop. There seems to be more grey than
clear areas in the law." Lobbying and Political Campaign Activities of Tax-Exempt
Organizations,supra note 142 (statement of Chairman Pickle).
151. Id. (statement of Alan P. Dye).
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as the communication takes no position with respect to whether
the reader should support or oppose a particular candidate.' 5 2
The substantive changes to section 501(c)(3) should apply
to all organizations exempt under that section except for religious groups. For churches, both the restrictions on lobbying
and those on political activity require a separate remedy.
Black's Law Dictionary defines worship to include exhortation 5to3
obedience or following of the mandates of the Divine Being.'
The "offenses" that make up ARM's case against tax exemption
for the Catholic Church clearly fall within this definition, and
therein lies the rub.' 5 4 Viewed in this light, government prohibition or taxation of such activity is certainly inappropriate,
which points to the proper approach to those restrictions as
they apply to churches: eliminate them.
Such an approach would seem to trade one headache for
another. No longer would the IRS or exempt organizations
have to ponder what is "substantial," or what behavior is forbidden. Rather, the courts would be saddled with the task of
deciding what groups are properly called churches and which
are merely political organizations wrapped in simulacra of religion. But the judicial system already has this task. In Africa v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,'-- for instance, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit set forth a three-part test for
determining whether a plaintiff's goals are religious. The test
addresses the questions of (1) whether the beliefs address fundamental and ultimate questions concerning the human condition, (2) whether the beliefs are comprehensive in nature and
constitute an entire system of belief instead of merely an isolated teaching, and (3) whether the beliefs are manifested in
external forms.' 56
Such judgments may not be easy, but are made none the
less. And, they must be -made, for "religious bodies are
afforded additional constitutional protection precisely because
of their religious character."' 5 7 The free exercise clause
applies only to those persons or groups whose religion is burdened. As they stand, the political restrictions of section
501(c)(3) status are a mighty burden indeed.
152.
153.
154.
155.
Church
1982).
156.
157.

Id.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1440 (5th ed. 1979).
See Amended Complaint, supra note 7.
662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982). See also
of The Chosen People v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Minn.
662 F.2d at 1032.
Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 17.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the political activity
restrictions of the current version of section 501(c)(3) are
unconstitutional, unwise, and in disagreement with the modern
trend in tax law. The net effect of these deficiencies is a restriction of the voice of religion and its cry for moral action in the
public square, which is the debate that accompanies the formation of public policy. The proposed changes in section
501 (c)(3) should rectify this situation and help restore the voice
of morality to its essential position in the marketplace of ideas.
The words of Oliver Cromwell to dismiss the Long Parliament apply equally well to the political activity restrictions of
section 501(c)(3): "You have sat too long here for any good
you have been doing. Depart, 1'I say,
and let us have done with
8
you. In the name of God, go. 1

158.

Quoted by Leo Amery, 360

PARL. DEB.

H.C. (5th ser.) 1150 (1940).

